'The United States is among the most attacked countries in the world regarding cyber threats to critical infrastructure,' says Matthijs van der Wel-ter Weel, Strategic Advisor at Orange Cyberdefense. 'International cooperation is not a favor to allies, but an essential defense mechanism for the US itself.'
The numbers do not lie: US is the primary target
According to the recently published research report Security Navigator 2026, state actors, particularly China, are directing their heaviest cyber campaigns at American infrastructure. The Salt Typhoon operation targeted nine major American telecom providers and gained access to core routers, interception systems, and metadata of millions of citizens. The impact was profound and long-lasting. European countries appeared in the report mainly as indirect targets or part of supply chains.
Volt Typhoon also explicitly targeted American energy, water, and transportation systems. The report describes such attacks as a fixed component of state strategy, with the United States structurally being the primary target.
'Especially in a context where you are constantly under fire, international cooperation is not a matter of politeness. It is a first line of defense,' says Van der Wel-ter Weel. 'By combining observations and analyses from allies, early recognition occurs. No single country sees the entire threat landscape alone.'
Cybersecurity as an easy target for budget cuts
It is relatively easy to cut back on cybersecurity. The subject is complex, largely invisible to the general public, and difficult to translate into direct political or societal benefits. International cyber agreements are quickly framed as abstract consultation structures, while their value lies precisely in prevention and early detection.
However, the consequences of this choice are anything but abstract. Less cooperation means less visibility on threats, slower response, and greater vulnerability of vital infrastructure. By withdrawing from international cybersecurity organizations, the US is primarily cutting into its own flesh, according to Orange Cyberdefense.
Europe: mature, but not naive
Does this mean that Europe is left empty-handed? Certainly not, states Orange Cyberdefense. The time when European cyber resilience depended on American capacity is behind us. European CERTs have matured, and organizations like ENISA and Europol provide operational value. And legislation such as NIS2, DORA, and the Cyber Resilience Act enforce structural improvements that go beyond voluntary standards.
'Grieving is allowed, but standing still is not,' says Van der Wel-ter Weel. 'Europe can move on. Establishing and maintaining international cyber agreements and joint responses will cost more money, more coordination, and more time without American participation, but Europe can bear it. The romance of automatic alliances gives way to mature realism.'
International cooperation remains functional
Orange Cyberdefense emphasizes that international cooperation is still necessary. The US, Europe, Canada, Japan, and other allies share a digital infrastructure, economy, and threat landscape. Terminating formal ties does not change the shared vulnerabilities.
'Operation Endgame, Hive, Emotet: time and again it becomes clear how important joint actions are to dismantle the infrastructure of cybercriminals,' says Van der Wel-ter Weel. 'The FBI and CISA have repeatedly acknowledged this themselves. It is not the discussion groups that fail; it is the politics that no longer has the patience for it. Threats do not adhere to national borders. Only politics still does. And it is precisely in that vacuum that cybercriminals find the space to operate.'
